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Executive Summary
Since the mid-1970s Niger has suffered from politi­
cal instability and corruption. Following a 1996 
coup, the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund [IMF] worked with Niger to implement vari­
ous structural adjustment programs, but nearly 10 
years later, in 2004—2005, the country faced a 
food crisis. One-third of Niger's population suf­
fered from high levels of food insecurity and 
vulnerability. Yet the food crisis gained little media 
coverage; the government of Niger denied the 
country was even faced with a food crisis and con­
tinued to claim that food shortages were normal 
for this country.
As the crisis progressed, Niger did receive aid, yet 
efforts to improve the situation did not help. Many 
blamed the situation in Niger on donor coun­
tries—their delay in sending assistance and their 
lack of overall assistance. Others blamed the struc­
tural adjustment programs of the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, and most found at 
least some fault with the Nigerien government. The 
food crisis in Niger evolved into one of the largest 
food crisis "blame games."
Numerous challenges arise as policymakers try to 
craft a common solution appropriate for all stake­
holders. In an analysis of what happened in Niger 
and why food aid was so ineffective, many central 
themes emerge. Corrupt governance was one issue, 
as was the timeliness of food aid. Food aid arrived 
too late; it then became available at the time of 
Niger's harvest, depressing market prices of Niger's 
staple foods. The United Nations, then, must 
examine how to most effectively target the neediest 
populations and how to best access assistance for 
these emergencies. In addition, one cannot separate 
the food crisis from the chronic poverty that exists 
in the country. Poor infrastructure, Niger's geo­
graphic position as a landlocked country, and low 
agricultural productivity remain a challenge to the 
overall health of the region.
Many policy options exist for the donor countries, 
international institutions, and the government of 
Niger. Such options include improving the United 
Nations' Central Emergency Revolving Fund, estab­
lishing a Global Food Aid Compact, and reforming 
the Nigerien government [including implementing 
the country's poverty reduction strategy]. Such
steps can help prevent future crises and help 
alleviate the suffering of the people of Niger.
Your assignment is to develop a set of policies that 
will satisfy the main stakeholder groups.
Background
A  landlocked country roughly twice the size of 
Texas with a population of approximately 12 million, 
Niger experienced a massive food crisis in 2004— 
2005. In the 2 0 0 4  Emergency Assessment of 
Niger, the World Food Programme [WFP] esti­
mated that "3.8 million people nationwide face a 
high level of food insecurity/ vulnerability, i.e. their 
food consumption and access to  food are severely 
inadequate" [WFP 2005],
The physical characteristics of Niger make the 
country susceptible to food shortages. It is 
extremely hot and dry, droughts are common, and 
less than 4  percent of the land is arable [the arable 
land runs in a band across the southernmost part 
of the country] [Lovgre 2005]. Locust invasions 
can occur, destroying much of the pasture neces­
sary for livestock grazing, and a large invasion did 
occur before the 2004—2005 crisis. It is estimated 
that more than 50  percent of Niger's cattle have 
died from lack of food [Lovgre 2005],
Source:
http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/countrv/niger.html.
Out of 177 countries ranked according to devel­
opment status, the United Nations Development 
Programme ranks Niger 176th—second to last. The 
poverty rate is around 63 percent, and the fertility 
rate is between 7.8 and 8 children per woman—the 
highest in the world. By 2050 it is estimated that 
Niger will be the second most populous country in 
West Africa. Because the population keeps increas­
ing, it is unlikely that Niger's food supply will ever 
meet the country's demand. Niger's subsistence 
crops consist of millet, sorghum, and cassava.
A large percentage of food-insecure households 
depend primarily on petty trade, remittances, and 
gifts. Only 23 percent of these food-insecure 
households raise cattle. The WFP's Emergency 
Assessment found extremely high levels of malnu­
trition, with 40 percent of children under five 
affected by stunting nationally. A WFP and Hellen 
Keller International survey found the wasting rate 
to be 13.4 percent among children 6-59 months of 
age [WFP 2005],
Minimal natural resources and high population 
growth rates aside, poor infrastructure and a lack 
of access to markets also contribute to the high 
poverty rate in Niger. Niger is a former uranium 
exporter and had easy access to international 
markets at one time. As this industry came to an 
end in the 1980s, exports declined. Agricultural 
products and livestock are potential export goods, 
but they are largely traded informally and have yet 
to become a large share of any "official" market. 
Worsening road conditions and poor telecommuni­
cations infrastructure also contribute to Niger's 
isolation from Africa and the rest of the world.
Throughout the 1990s, there was a drastic degrada­
tion in health services. In 1995 the World Health 
Organization [WHO] estimated that Niger had only 
one doctor per 62,606 inhabitants and one mater­
nity and child care center per 28,000 children. 
Only 14.4 percent of children between one and two 
years of age were vaccinated. Niger also has the 
lowest level of education in West Africa, with an 
illiteracy rate at around 80 percent [ANB-BIA 
2000],
Current government policies, past regulations, and 
a wide range of historical events have also helped 
foster the poverty cycle in Niger. About eight suc­
cessful or attempted coups d'etat occurred between 
1974 and 1999, resulting in feelings of uneasiness
and political instability. In 1996 Ibrahim Bare 
MaTnassara took power in a coup, leading many of 
Niger's donors to withdraw their assistance pro­
grams. MaTnassara was assassinated in 1999 by his 
own guards. Later that year democratic elections 
were held, bringing Tandja Mamadou to the presi­
dency. After these elections, foreign assistance was 
reinstated by many of the donors who had pre­
viously withdrawn their aid to Niger. During this 
time, there was also intense political corruption and 
embezzlement of public funds by government 
officials.
It was thought that with the election of President 
Tandja, confidence and stability would be restored 
to the government. Although conditions did 
improve, corruption is still apparent, and trans­
parency and accountability are minimal. Judicial 
oversight and enforcement of legal rights are 
absent from the legal system. Gender rights are 
rarely respected. Public sector institutions are 
poorly developed, and the citizens of Niger have 
little confidence in them. The majority of indi­
viduals in Niger lack access to basic public goods 
and social services. Thousands of public sector 
employees have gone on strike because of unpaid 
wages. In both the public and private sectors, there 
is a lack of education and professional skills. 
Because of political instability, poor management, 
and a shortage of training facilities to produce a 
highly skilled workforce, those who are educated 
often leave the country in search of better work.
About 80 percent of Nigeriens work in the agri­
cultural and the informal sectors. The government's 
attempts to assure fair working conditions in the 
formal sector—a required six weeks of paid vaca­
tion every year for employees, a minimum wage of 
US$35 per month [higher than the local market 
level], a maximum work day of nine hours, restric­
tions on weekend work, and prohibition of 
layoffs—have discouraged business development. 
Each year, the World Bank publishes a list of the 
best countries in which to start or operate a busi­
ness. In Doing Business in 2006, the World Bank 
ranked Niger 150th out of 155 [Kristof 2005],
The IMF has supported economic reforms in Niger 
through the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facil­
ity [ESAF] and the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility [PGRF], A debt repayment package was put 
in place under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
[HIPC] program. The World Bank and the IMF
encouraged the government to cut spending and 
privatize state enterprises. By 2004 Niger had 
fulfilled its duties under the HIPC, including 
presenting a poverty reduction strategy paper 
(PRSP). According to the World Bank and IMF, the 
PRSP “provided an appropriate analysis of poverty 
in Niger and of the authorities' strategy to alleviate 
it." Because of these reforms, the Paris Club 
creditors canceled Niger's total external debt (IMF 
2004).
The PRSP addresses many of the issues underlying 
Niger's food shortage. It includes strategies for 
poverty reduction to the year 2015 and incor­
porates a multitude of issues, many related to food 
security. Among Niger's national priorities are 
health, water and sanitation, development of road 
transportation, and political and economic gover­
nance. In addition, the PRSP addresses priorities for 
the productive sectors. In the rural sector, high- 
priority actions include agro-sylvo-pastoral devel­
opment and food security, desertification control 
and management of natural resources, and income­
generating activities and development [IMF 2002).
Beginning in 2004, drought, locust invasion, and a 
continual cycle of low agricultural productivity and 
high food prices caused Niger to spiral downward 
into one of the world's worst food crises.
Stakeholders
The Blame Game
A id  groups say the U N  has been too slow, 
and U N  officials say money from  donors 
was even slower, and ju st about everyone 
agrees that N iger's government should 
have asked fo r  help sooner (New York 
Times 2005).
The food crisis in Niger has become one of the 
most complex emergencies in West Africa. Plans to 
alleviate starvation were slow and largely ineffective. 
Food aid arrived too late, leading to increased 
deaths and malnutrition. When food aid did arrive, 
it came during Niger's harvest, depressing the 
market prices of Niger's staple foods.
Because of these missteps, the current crisis has 
evolved into one of the world's largest blame 
games. It is still unclear exactly who is at fault or
what went wrong. Many were quick to blame 
donor countries, who supposedly failed to provide 
adequate assistance. One must also ask why Niger 
ended up in this crisis in the first place and look at 
the role and responsibilities of the Nigerien 
government.
Donor Countries
Numerous countries and agencies lend assistance to 
Niger. Some of the more notable development 
partners are Belgium, Canada, China, the European 
Union, France, Germany, Japan, the African Devel­
opment Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank [World 
Bank 2007).
In 2005 the United States donated US$13.75 
million for various programs to battle food in­
security in Niger. U.S. assistance included aid 
US$500,000 in seed money for supplemental 
feeding programs for children from 24,000 fami­
lies. In August 2005 the United States donated 
another US$7.5 million as part of the West Africa 
Regional Program [WARP), a large U.S. program 
focused on regional development and poverty 
alleviation [USAID 2005). Yet U.S. assistance 
amounts to only 5 percent of total aid to Niger.
Niger and some international institutions were 
quick to blame donor countries for their lack of 
support, yet Niger's dependence on this aid is 
enormous. In 2002 donor assistance accounted for 
45 percent of Niger's government budget and 80 
percent of its capital budget (U.S. Department of 
State 2007).
In the 2004—2005 food crisis, donors chose to 
send aid independently of the UN and other agen­
cies. Because of this decision, the timing of the aid 
varied by country, and Niger failed to receive the 
aid when it was most needed.
The United Nations/World Food 
Programme
The WFP's 2004 Emergency Assessment of Niger 
details many of the causes of the food crisis. Some 
of the findings, as stated in the Emergency 
Assessment, include (WFP 2005):
• Niger had overall decreased production 
and income-earning opportunities prior to 
2004.
• Production of millet, sorghum, maize, and 
rice fell by 9 percent in 2004/05 com­
pared with the 1999-2003 average [a 16 
percent decrease in the domestic per capita 
supply of food],
• Cereal imports fell by 60 percent between 
January-May 2004 and January-May 
2005. According to the assessment, "This 
can be attributed to higher prices on 
Nigerian markets, tightening of controls 
on cross-border trade, and the slowdown 
of imports from Burkina Faso" [WFP 
2005, 5-6).
• Prices for staple foods increased [37 per­
cent increase for millet, 25 percent for 
sorghum, and 23 percent for maize).
• Sheep and goat prices fell by 23 percent.
A rise in staple food prices can be partly attributed 
to traders in Niger who export grain to wealthier 
neighboring countries [Vasagar 2005). A decline in 
the terms of trade between cereals and livestock led 
to a significant decline in the income of those 
reliant on livestock sales.
Between September 2004 and August 2005, the 
WFP made various appeals for aid. In February 
2005 WFP Niger shifted its focus away from the 
Niger development program and toward the food 
crisis. Around this time, the government of Niger 
and the WFP agreed to subsidize cereals rather 
than distribute free food [this became an enormous 
debate, to be discussed later in greater detail). By 
August 2005 US$22.8 million had been pledged to 
the WFP.
As the crisis continued, the United Nations and 
various nongovernmental organizations [NGOs) 
blamed donor countries for much of the delay in 
food aid, while other NGOs blamed the United 
Nations for implementing misguided food assis­
tance programs.
It took 10 months for the first general food distri­
bution to get sent to villages in Niger [Timberg 
2005). One reason for the scant aid was likely 
Niger's lack of assets [like petroleum); in many 
food assistance situations, those countries with 
more assets receive aid at a greater speed and in 
larger numbers. Another reason for the delay in
assistance was the large number of natural disasters 
that occurred between August and November 
2005. After Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, 
funds to Niger began to dwindle. Finally, Niger's 
hunger is localized and does not expose others to 
these dangers. Emergency interventions for 
localized [and isolated) hunger can be rare, allowing 
the country to receive aid only after it has 
garnered media exposure.
In general, these delays have lead to increased 
deaths and a significant rise in the cost of aid. The 
UN estimated that the delay in sending food aid to 
Niger increased the cost of food assistance from 
US$1/child to about US$80/child [Murphy 2005). 
Instead of being shipped by sea and over land, the 
food had to be expedited and flown to Niger.
Many NGOs claimed that the food aid distributed 
by the WFP was misdirected and did not reach 
those most in need of assistance. Medicins Sans 
Frontieres [MSF) said that the aid reached the 
moderately malnourished rather than those in the 
most extreme stages of starvation. They went on to 
say that the eastern Zinder province, one of the 
poorest regions, received no aid [BBC News 
2005a). MSF also released a statement in September 
2005 stating that there were both bureaucratic and 
logistical problems with food aid deliveries to and 
within Niger. The WFP admitted to minor prob­
lems in food distribution [such as delays at the 
Burkina Faso-Niger border) but largely rejected 
the idea that aid was misdirected [Afrol News 
2005). Journalists noted, however, that aid may not 
have been misdirected and that they actually found 
men "locking away food stores when they leave 
their villages for any length of time" [BBC News 
2005a).
International Institutions
The World Bank and the IMF are continually con­
fronted with a large number of critics. Just as they 
were criticized for their initial economic reforms 
imposed on Niger, they were then criticized for 
their handling of the food crisis in Niger.
Some of the criticism relates to two controversial 
programs that were part of the 2005 structural 
adjustment programs: the implementation of a 19 
percent value-added tax [VAT) on basic foodstuffs 
and the abolition of emergency grain reserves as a 
way to prevent distortion of markets. "Under the
letter of intent signed between the IMF and the 
Nigerien government in January to receive funding 
under a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
(PGRF], Niger agreed to extend VAT to milk, 
sugar, and wheat flour and reduce VAT exemp­
tions on water and electricity consumption" 
[Bretton Woods Project 2005). Johanne Sekkenes, 
leader of MSF in Niger, blames the IMF and the 
EU for pressuring Niger into implementing their 
structural adjustment programs [Bretton Woods 
Project 2005],
After much public protest, the VAT extension was 
abolished not long after being put in place. With 
regard to the sale of emergency grain reserves, the 
IMF denies ever encouraging this step in Niger 
(Bretton Woods Project 2005],
The IMF role in denying free food distribution is 
still being debated. Many people believed that the 
IMF encouraged the Nigerien government to sub­
sidize food, rather than give free handouts. The 
UK's Observer, in August 2005, stated that "the 
Niger government, under instruction from the IMF 
and EU, at first refused to distribute free food to 
those most in need," adding that "the powers that 
be did not want to depress market prices that 
benefited wholesalers and speculators." The IMF 
African department director denies that the IMF 
ever encouraged this policy (Bretton Woods 
Project 2005], Others believed that it was the 
Nigerien government's idea (not a recommendation 
from the IMF] to offer millet at subsidized prices, 
rather than hand out free food.
Also still debatable is whether or not this policy 
was "correct"—that is, if it did in fact prevent 
market distortion. What is known, however, is that 
the subsidized food offered was still much too 
expensive for poor people in Niger. Food remained 
on sale in local markets, yet the poor could not 
afford to buy it. After thousands of citizens 
protested in the streets of Niamey, the capital of 
Niger, the WFP began free food handouts in 2005.
The Nigerien Government
NGOs, donor countries, international institutions, 
and, of course, the Nigerien government must 
focus more on the government's own account­
ability and responsibility. In addition to the poor 
regulations and political instability that occurred 
before the famine, the government of Niger
shocked many in the way it chose to handle the 
food crisis.
As over 3 million people faced severe malnutrition 
and food insecurity, the government continued to 
deny that its people were suffering. A BBC news 
report stated that Niger's government denied wide­
spread starvation, even claiming that the most 
recent harvest had produced a food surplus [BBC 
News 2005b], Ben Omar Mohamed, a government 
spokesman, accused the WFP of sending out false 
information regarding Niger and of trying to 
discredit the country (Mamane 2005].
President Tandja acknowledged that there were 
food shortages but claimed that these conditions 
were more or less normal for Niger [Mamane 
2005], He told BBC Radio, "The people of Niger 
look well fed, as you can see" (Loyn 2005], This 
statement drew much criticism from the public and 
the media as they continued to see images of 
severely malnourished children.
One explanation for President Tandja's lack of 
response could have been fear that international 
attention to Niger's food crisis would jeopardize 
Niger's image and the 2005 Nigerien-hosted 
Francophonie Games.
Much of the media wanted to document what the 
Nigerien government denied. The International 
Press Institute (IPI] reported government pressure 
to keep findings of starvation, hunger, and corrup­
tion in Niger secret. "In a sign of the government's 
displeasure at the mention of famine, Tchirgni 
Mainouna, editor-in-chief of the government 
weekly, Sahel Dimanche, was removed from her 
position and given three months leave after the 
newspaper's 29 April issue warned of an impending 
famine" (International Press Institute 2005].
The I PI also stated, "Aside from reporting on the 
food crisis, the media also investigated the flow of 
aid into the country and its distribution. Some 
reports highlighted claims that ruling party officials 
were diverting aid to their own supporters. This led 
to a legal complaint from the governor of the 
Agadez region, Yahaya Yandaka, against Hamed 
Assaleh Raliou, director of the independent Sahara 
FM. Raliou was arrested and then given bail. He 
appeared before the Agadez regional court on 15 
July and faces further hearings" (International Press 
Institute 2005],
At a time when the independent media could act as 
a warning system and assist the government in the 
crisis, journalists have instead been jailed and fined 
for reporting the truth.
Given that Niamey is in the southernmost part of 
the country, relatively far from the poorest regions 
and those who suffer most, the government has 
been accused of being disconnected from its poor 
people and not caring about the nomadic poor 
who live in the northernmost part of the country 
[Anarkismo 2005], This disconnect, according to 
accusers, has resulted in both poor food aid distri­
bution and a lack of effective policies to enhance 
smallholder farmer food production.
The crisis continues, as does the cycle of blame. 
The food crisis is not as severe as it was during 
2004-2005, but large amounts of severe food 
insecurity remain throughout Niger.
Policy Options
Many of the policy options available will help 
establish a more effective food aid system that 
could prevent future “blame games" and ineffective 
treatment methods. The United Nations, donor 
countries, and the government of Niger can 
establish a host of reforms and effective policies.
Policy Options for the United Nations and 
Donor Countries
Aid was slow in getting to Niger. Appeals for aid 
did not result in the funds necessary to assist the 
poor. The UN was dependent, as it is in many food 
crises, on the media. If there is heavy media cover­
age of an event [like the tsunami in Southeast Asia 
and the Darfur conflict in Sudan], more aid is likely 
to flow to these countries. This is a dangerous situ­
ation, however, because many emergency situations 
go undocumented by the media. The BBC was the 
first international news company to show pictures 
of Niger's food crisis, but not until July 2005, 
months after the beginning of the catastrophe.
Central Em ergency Revolving Fund  One way to 
improve the timeliness and effectiveness of food aid 
may be to update the UN's Central Emergency 
Revolving Fund [CERFJ. Oxfam International
recently published a report focused on how best to 
reform the CERF [Oxfam International 2005],
Established in 1992, the current CERF is set up to 
respond to emergencies that donors do not choose 
to fund [that is, "neglected emergencies"]. It 
includes a US$50 million account that the UN can 
tap into for various emergencies. If the UN wants 
to use this money, it must indicate how it plans to 
replenish the used funds. Oxfam International 
states, "Due to its limited size and rules of opera­
tion, the existing fund has done little to spur 
timely and sufficient responses to emergencies that 
donors are unwilling to fund" [Oxfam International 
2005],
Donor governments know they need to do more 
to improve the timeliness and predictability of aid. 
Given the problems associated with the current 
CERF, an updated CERF would contain a larger pot 
of money and establish greater efficiency in pro­
viding funds to a country in crisis. Although 
donors have made this commitment, many have 
still failed to commit enough funds to get to US$1 
billion, the minimum amount Oxfam believes is 
necessary to get address these neglected emer­
gencies. One way to identify the need for increased 
aid is through the UN's Consolidated Appeal 
Process [CAP], The difference between the CAP [an 
appeal for aid for a complex humanitarian emer­
gency] and the amount actually donated for that 
crisis can help identify the increased need for assis­
tance. Oxfam has reported that in 2004, less than 
two-thirds of the UN's CAP requirements were 
met [Oxfam International 2005],
In addition, because the updated CERF is large, can 
be dispensed rapidly, and can be used for neglected 
emergencies, assistance to these countries should 
be less reliant on the media. In the case of Niger, 
this change is especially useful. When governments 
attempt to cover up their crises, as in Niger, the 
media are often kept far away from the most 
desperate regions and the public remains 
uninformed.
This updated CERF, according to Oxfam, could be 
financed by donor governments. In total, they say, 
it represents less than US$1 per person from the 
rich OECD countries.
Besides updating the current CERF, additional 
measures can be improved. Famine early warning
systems can be made more effective. Donors, 
NGOs, and international institutions had con­
flicting perceptions of the severity of the initial 
food crisis. Resources must be funneled into 
improving the famine early warning systems to help 
prevent such miscalculations. Indeed, if proper 
calculations can be completed on the appropriate 
data, crises may be prevented before they arise. It 
is, therefore, of utmost importance to improve the 
amount and type of data collected.
Donor countries could also improve their com­
munication with each other and with UN agencies. 
In addition, food aid must be appropriately 
targeted and distributed to those who need it most.
Overall, new policies related to food emergencies 
and new funds that are sent should be directed to 
countries before emergencies strike. In other 
words, assistance must be sent before a crisis gets 
out of control.
The Global Food A id  Compact In September 2003 
the Berlin Statement of Food Aid for Sustainable 
Food Security, created at a food aid workshop in 
Germany, suggested a Global Food Aid Compact. 
Such a compact could be used as an improved 
mechanism for the administration of food aid 
around the world [Barrett and Maxwell 2005],
The current food aid monitoring system, the Food 
Aid Convention [FAC], is a fairly weak document, 
with “no mechanism for effectively monitoring or 
enforcing signatories' compliance with terms to 
which they have agreed" [Barrett and Maxwell 
2005, 3], The FAC was revised in 1999 to permit 
"cash contributions to transport and other delivery 
costs to be counted against the value of commit­
ments, setting a precedent for recognizing financial 
contributions to food procurement as food aid 
commitments, however it does not count ship­
ments of higher value commodities against sig­
natory commitments, putting the emphasis squarely 
on basic grains, pulses, root crops and edible oils 
that are most valuable in addressing emergency 
needs" (Barrett and Maxwell 2005, 7], Within the 
FAC, there is also a weak prohibition against "tied 
food aid." Food aid directly or indirectly tied to 
commercial exports of agricultural products can 
significantly increase the cost of food aid and cause 
great delays in delivery. "The median time for a 
formal request for emergency food aid from the 
U.S. until port delivery is nearly five months"
(Barrett and Maxwell 2005, 8-9], The FAC has 
been revised six times since 1999 and excludes the 
participation of recipient countries. Other major 
food aid players, including the WFP and the Devel­
opment Assistance Committee of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
[OECD], have no legal role in governing the 
movement and administration of food aid within 
the FAC.
The Global Food Aid Compact would seek to 
resolve the challenges associated with the current 
FAC, including the lack of accountability, effi­
ciency, and oversight. First, the GFAC would 
include recipient-country governments, operational 
agencies, and donor countries. Second, the GFAC 
would force donors to make commitments in terms 
of tonnage, physical volume, and cash. Assistance 
(in the form of grants, not loans] could be sent to 
countries with ineffective or nonexistent govern­
ments. The GFAC, as currently planned, would be 
linked to the World Trade Organization [WTO] for 
monitoring and enforcement, although it would be 
administered through a Global Food Aid Council. 
As explained by Chris Barrett and Dan Maxwell, the 
Global Food Aid Council would be "an interagency 
body drawing on pre-existing technical capacity 
necessary to oversee and implement the compact" 
[Barrett and Maxwell 2005, 14], Finally, the new 
GFAC would include a code of conduct where "all 
signatories would agree to role-specific obligations 
as well as to a universal set of underlying principles 
governing the allocation, utilization, and monitor­
ing of food aid" (Barrett and Maxwell 2005, 20], 
Currently, all food aid codes of conduct are volun­
tary.
In addition, aid agencies and governments must 
focus on more than the distribution of aid. It is 
easy to overlook, for example, immunizations and 
deteriorating livestock while agencies discuss 
whether or not it is more appropriate to give free 
food or subsidized food handouts. As already 
noted, the United Nations must also plan for 
uncertainty and create contingency plans, and there 
must be increased communication between all 
agencies and stakeholders (ODI 2005], It is also 
important to make efforts to address long-term 
sustainable solutions, including investing in 
increased agricultural productivity.
Niger's Famine and the Role o f  Food A id
Leivin
Policy Options for Niger
Perhaps the most important changes must arise 
within Niger. Food shortages, crises, and famines 
cannot be thought of as isolated events. They are 
inextricably linked to the chronic poverty that per­
vades much of Western Africa. As a result, 
government must establish policies that address 
both the continual cycle of poverty and emergency 
situations.
Niger needs policies that address the lack of educa­
tion, the lack of health care, current disincentives 
for businesses, the lack of rural infrastructure, and 
the low levels of agricultural productivity. These 
policies can be addressed within the Nigerien gov­
ernment, the private sector, or both. Both the 
government and the private sector can and should 
take steps to overcome these problems.
Niger must do more to improve the overall health 
care situation in the country because worsening 
health conditions have large negative economic 
impacts, contributing to both rising costs and 
decreased productivity. Increased rates of malaria 
and malnutrition also increase the need for food 
aid. The soaring population growth rate must be 
recognized and controlled through education and 
other policies.
In addition, rural infrastructure improvements are 
critical. Poor road conditions add to Niger's isola­
tion as well as increasing the time and money it 
takes to reach a rural village. Given Niger's geo­
graphic location and lack of natural resources, 
efforts must also be made to increase agricultural 
productivity. As a short-term policy option, the 
Nigerien government can invest in emergency 
stockpiles of food so that, during food shortages, 
there is less dependence on foreign aid.
The IMF recommends consideration of the follow­
ing issues as potential goals within Niger:
. Improved economic growth rates
. Improvement of social indicators
. A reduction in the economy's heavy 
dependence on foreign aid 
. Vulnerability to exogenous shocks 
. Continued lowering of the high debt 
burden
• Fiscal consolidation
• Lowered production costs
• Diversification of the production and 
export base of the economy
• Improved competitiveness and business 
climate
• Tax reform [including efforts to widen the 
tax base and bring at least part of the 
informal sector into the tax system]
• Wage restraint
• Prioritized spending
• Safety nets [buffers] for vulnerable groups
• Minimized direct involvement of the public 
sector in the economy
• Strengthened institutional capacity [espe­
cially related to tax, customs administra­
tion, debt management, and statistics]
• Improvement of timeliness, quality, and 
coverage of Niger's economic data
• Implementation of the poverty reduction 
strategy paper
The Policy Challenge
Implementing appropriate policies to more effec­
tively deal with both Niger's famine and other food 
shortages in West Africa requires an appropriate 
analysis of the challenges that arise within this
situation.
Many central themes can be teased out from the 
discussion. As this case study shows, corrupt 
governance is a severe problem in Niger and must 
be addressed before food aid distribution can be 
administered appropriately. The timeliness of food 
aid is another aspect of food distribution that must 
be examined. In the case of Niger in 2004-2005, 
food aid arrived too late. Once food aid did arrive, 
it was harvest time, and the increased food in 
Niger's markets depressed the price of the coun­
try's staple foods. The delay in food aid delivery 
can be attributed to a number of factors, including 
the Nigerien government's rejection of an approach 
based on free food handouts, slow reaction by 
donor countries, and a UN fund that could not be 
accessed quickly enough. The UN and the WFP 
must come up with a policy that can effectively 
distribute food aid [that is, reach the target popula­
tion at the appropriate time]. Chronic poverty still 
pervades Niger, caused by many factors including 
poor infrastructure, low agricultural productivity, a 
lack of natural resources, increased rates of
HIV/AIDS, a high rate of population growth, and 
poor governance.
Stakeholders should find a way to end the blame 
game and work on establishing a policy with a 
common solution appropriate for the alleviation of 
poverty and acceptable to each stakeholder group.
Assignment
Your assignment is to develop a set of policies that 
will satisfy the main stakeholder groups.
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